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Abstract 
Belief in free will is founded on the idea that people are responsible for their behavior. People 
who believe in free will derive meaning in life from these beliefs. Conformity refers to 
succumbing to external pressures and imitating others’ behaviors. Sometimes, conformity 
involves a loss of self-awareness, which reduces perceived meaninglessness. We tested if 
disbelief in free will increases perceived meaninglessness and if people subsequently become 
more conformist to address this negative existential perception. We conducted three studies 
to test this hypothesis. In Study 1, experimentally induced disbelief in free will resulted in 
perceived meaninglessness. In Study 2, perceived meaninglessness correlated with 
conformity. Finally, in Study 3, perceived meaninglessness mediated the relationship 
between disbelief in free will and conformity, especially under high self-awareness. We 
conclude that perceptions about meaning play a central role in the relationship between 
disbelief in free will and conformity. 
Keywords: free will, conformity, meaning, self-awareness, existential psychology 
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Lost in the Crowd: Conformity as Escape Following Disbelief in Free Will 
Belief in free will involves trusting in one’s ability to make choices based on one’s 
own thoughts and values and being resistant to external pressures (Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b; 
Baumeister, Crescioni, & Alquist, 2011; Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014; Feldman, 
Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016). Accordingly, belief in free will fosters thoughtful reflection 
(Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Rigoni & Brass, 2014) and gives people a sense 
of meaning. In contrast, the absence of free will beliefs renders life as less meaningful 
(Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 2016; Moynihan, Igou, & Van Tilburg, 
2017a). 
Conformity refers to a change in behavior or belief designed to imitate or match those 
of real or imagined others (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). In some cases, rather than behaving in 
accordance with one’s values and judgments, people who conform yield to social pressure 
elicited by individuals and groups (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002). People 
conform due to different motivational orientations (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955): to obtain 
an accurate interpretation of reality, gain social approval, or maintain a positive self-concept 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Hence, conformity can be an active, 
effortful process (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012) or involve less cognitive engagement (e.g., 
while conforming to descriptive rather than injunctive norms; Cialdini, 2003). Our hypothesis 
concerns the latter facet of conformity that is the antagonist of belief in free will regarding 
self-determination. We tested if disbelief in free, associated with a lack of perceived meaning 
in life (Crescioni et al., 2016; Moynihan et al., 2017a), increases conformity as a means to 
escape this unfavorable existential state.  
DISBELIEF IN FREE WILL & CONFORMITY                                                                   4 
 
Our research extends on earlier work by Alquist, Ainsworth, and Baumeister (2013) 
by investigating if the relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity can be 
interpreted as an attempt at escaping meaninglessness (Wisman, 2006). Alquist et al.’s, 
(2013) findings hinted at the relationship between meaninglessness and disbelief in free will. 
In this regard, our research elaborates upon the causal link between disbelief in free will and 
conformity and their psychological underpinnings by adapting a different theoretical 
perspective. Accordingly, we incorporate the roles of two key constructs, meaninglessness 
perceptions and self-awareness. 
Conformity as Withdrawal 
Conformity buffers against meaninglessness by bolstering others’ approval, social 
ties, worldviews, self-esteem (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, & Paladino, 2004), and self-certainty 
(e.g., Gaffney & Hogg, 2017). Yet, we focus on the facet of conformity that is instigated by a 
deficit in effortful volition (Alquist et al., 2013), to provide an escape from meaninglessness 
by facilitating lowered self-awareness. In this regard, conformity can be used to cope with 
certain stressors (e.g., Gudjonsson, 1988, 1989; Gudjonsson, & Clark 1986; Gudjonsson & 
Sigurdsson, 2003). 
Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (2003) note that this type of conformity is associated with 
rejecting the reality of stressful events, withdrawing effort (e.g., Asch, 1952), and low levels 
of deliberation and control (Alquist et al., 2013; Epley & Gilovich, 1999). People can be 
consistent with a person or group without much thought, attention, or awareness of the self 
and one’s relationships to others (Bargh, 1994; Bremner, 2002; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Gopnik, Meltzhoff, & Kuhl, 1999; Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 
2006). Therefore, the route to conformity, in some circumstances, might be a habitual, 
automatic, low deliberation process (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 1999; Pendry & Carrick, 2001), 
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and a withdrawal from awareness of discomforting information regarding the self and the 
social situation. 
 
 
Disbelief in Free Will and Conformity 
Conformity may be a particularly useful strategy to deal with threats to belief in free 
will (Alquist et al., 2013). Forming opinions, resisting others’ influence, considering multiple 
options, and asserting them, requires effort (Kahan, Polivy, & Herman, 2003; Rigoni & 
Brass, 2014) and is cognitively depleting (Gailliot et al., 2007; Vohs et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, disbelief in free will facilitates a process to conform to other people’s 
expectations and wishes (Alquist et al., 2013; see also Feldman et al., 2014).  
Specifically, disbelief in free will diminishes the recruitment of cognitive resources 
for self-regulation and volition (Lynn, Van Dessel, & Brass, 2013; Lynn, Muhle-Karber, 
Aarts, & Brass, 2014; Rigoni, Kuhn, Sartori, & Brass, 2011; Rigoni, Pourtois, & Brass, 2015) 
and lessens feelings of responsibility and accountability (Clark et al., 2014; Stillman & 
Baumeister, 2010; Tetlock, 1983). Indeed, conformity can be used as a strategy to deal with 
feelings of diminished responsibility (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) by selecting less 
demanding choices (Rigoni et al., 2011), as is the case under disbelief in free will. As a result, 
autonomous thought and action needed for volition and self-control are reduced and instead 
conformity as a means to reduce self-related awareness and consciousness may be enacted 
(e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister et al., 2009; Baumeister, 
Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Rigoni, Kuhn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012).   
Disbelief in Free Will and Meaninglessness 
Additionally, life can appear meaningless without believing in free will (Alquist et al., 
2013; Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Davidov & Eisikovits, 2015; Flanagan, 1996). Belief in free 
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will subsumes control (Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b; Baumeister et al., 2010; 2011; Seto, Hicks, 
Davis, & Smallman, 2014; Vohs & Baumeister, 2010), an important source of meaning 
(Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Shariff, Schooler, & Vohs, 2008), and enhances the sense of 
control people experience when making decisions (Feldman et al., 2014; Feldman et al., 
2016; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011). Since autonomy, afforded by free will beliefs 
(Baumeister et al., 2009), plays a role in optimal human functioning, deprivation of this key 
aspect of human life may contribute to meaninglessness (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Heine et 
al., 2006; Kim, Seto, Davis, & Hicks, 2014; Seto et al., 2014). Indeed, belief in free will 
promotes meaning by allowing people to set meaningful goals (Crescioni et al., 2016) and 
achieve further sources of meaning (e.g., belongingness; Moynihan et al., 2017a). 
When people face a lack of or challenge to meaning, they attempt to address or avert 
this threat (Heine et al., 2006). Such strategies include conformity (Arndt et al., 2002; 
Pyszczynski et al., 1996; Simon et al., 1997; Wisman & Koole, 2003; Wisman & Shrira, 
2006). We reason that the lack of perceived meaning that comes with disbelief in free will 
likewise elicits defensive responses. That is, we propose that conformity can be used as a 
defensive response to deal with perceived meaninglessness, indicated by disbelief in free will. 
 Our hypothesis is consistent with established theoretical frameworks such as the 
meaning maintenance model (e.g., Heine et al., 2006). Nonetheless, conformity involving a 
withdrawal from the self is a process that is particularly well informed by the existential 
escape hypothesis (Wisman, 2006), which extends on previous frameworks. Thus, our 
general reasoning follows the meaning maintenance model while the existential escape 
hypothesis allows us to make particular predictions with regard to our chosen research topic. 
Conformity as an Escape From Meaninglessness 
We propose that conformity is a means of dealing with adverse perceptions of 
meaninglessness, captured by self-awareness (e.g., Wisman, 2006; Wisman & Koole, 2003). 
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The extent to which people are affected by a challenge to meaning depends on how strongly 
they are inclined to introspection, represented by individual differences in self-awareness 
(Taubman & Noy, 2010; Wisman, Heflick, & Goldenberg, 2015). Thus, people with a 
tendency for symbolic self-awareness are more acutely aware if a lack of meaning is present 
(Kim et al., 2014). Symbolic self-awareness refers to people’s capacity for a flexible, multi-
faceted, and abstract cognitive representation of one’s own attributes (Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 1997; Skowronski & Sedikides, 2017). Directing attention toward the self 
initiates an evaluative process, in which one’s current state is compared with ideal standards 
on salient dimensions (e.g., meaninglessness; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). As a result, 
perceived discrepancies between the actual self (meaningless) and ideal self (meaningful) are 
enhanced (Duval, Duval, & Mulilis, 1992; Phillips & Silvia, 2005; Silvia, 2001).  
Consistently, perceptions of meaning-threats are enhanced under conditions of greater 
self-awareness (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003; Taubman Ben-Ari & Noy, 2010). These 
discrepancies encourage people to address adverse self-awareness (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, 
Simon, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1998; Carver, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gollwitzer 
& Wicklund, 1985; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Silvia & Phillips, 2013). Thus, when beliefs in free 
will are challenged, people may seek to avoid self-awareness associated with increased 
perceptions of meaninglessness.  
Given that conformity engenders a loss of self-awareness in some circumstances 
(Diener, 1979; Mullen, 1991; Zimbardo, 2007), Wisman (2006) suggested that conformity 
may be used as an existential response to meaninglessness (e.g., Arndt et al., 2002; Wisman 
& Koole, 2003; Wisman & Shrira, 2006). Indeed, when objective self-awareness is lowered 
via conformity, one ceases comparing one’s behavior against internal standards (e.g., self-
discrepancies; Mann, Newton, & Innes, 1982). Accordingly, conformity may be used to 
dampen perceived meaninglessness in the symbolic self, signaled by meaning threats (e.g., 
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Wisman, 2006). Further, conformity may be a particularly suitable method to address 
meaninglessness signaled by disbelief in free will considering that the former may at times be 
a habitual, spontaneous response (e.g., Arndt et al., 2002), facilitated by lowered volition and 
promoted by challenges to belief in free will (e.g., Alquist et al., 2013; Baumeister et al., 
2009; Stillman et al., 2011).  
Consistently, Wisman and Koole (2003) found that mortality salience, another 
meaning threat, led to increased tendencies to sit with others, as opposed to sitting alone. 
Critically, this occurred even if the group members threatened participants’ worldviews, a 
source of meaning. In a replication, Wisman and Shrira (2006) also noted that participants 
were unwilling to increase contact with confederates. That is, participants sought to lose 
themselves in a group rather than defend or attack their worldviews or ultimately using 
symbolic self-awareness (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003). Consistently, in line with our 
chosen existential escape approach (e.g., Kesebir & Pyszczynski 2012; Wisman, 2006), we 
argue that conformity in response to disbelief in free will may be understood, at least in part, 
as a means of dealing with perceived meaninglessness associated with challenging such 
beliefs, particularly among those high in self-awareness. 
The Present Research 
We investigated conformity as a response to the perceived meaninglessness that 
disbelief in free will instigates. We did this in three studies using experimental and 
correlational designs. In Study 1, we tested if there was a causal effect of disbelief in free will 
on meaninglessness. In Study 2, we investigated the relationship between perceived 
meaninglessness and conformity using correlational data. In Study 3, we investigated if the 
relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity is mediated by perceived 
meaninglessness (i.e., people conform in response to the perceived meaninglessness that 
comes with disbelief in free will), using a correlational design. We also measured individual 
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differences in self-awareness in Study 3. In accordance with the literature (e.g., Kesebir & 
Pyszczynski, 2012; Moynihan et al., 2015; Moynihan, Igou, & Van Tilburg, 2017b; Wisman, 
2006; Wisman et al., 2015), we predicted that perceptions of meaninglessness following 
disbelief in free will would be associated with increased conformity, at higher levels of 
dispositional self-awareness.  
Study 1 
 We investigated if disbelief in free will promotes perceptions of meaninglessness. 
Again, belief in free will enhances the sense of control people experience when making 
decisions (Feldman et al., 2016; Stillman et al., 2011). Self-control is an important source of 
meaning (Heine et al., 2006; Shariff et al., 2008) because personal choice over one’s 
outcomes, provided by free will beliefs, makes events and experiences seem meaningful 
(Bergner & Ramon, 2014; Seto et al., 2014). Depriving this key aspect of human life may 
contribute to meaninglessness (Heine et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2014) and prevent people from 
achieving other sources of meaning (e.g., belongingness; Moynihan et al., 2017a). Although 
the relationship between belief in free will and meaningfulness has been identified in 
previous research (Crescioni et al., 2016), we aimed to corroborate disbelief in free will’s 
credentials as a meaning threat, considering the lack of experimental research in this area. We 
predicted that disbelief in free will would be associated with increased meaninglessness 
(Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Kim et al., 2014; Seto et al., 2014). To test our hypothesis, 
participants read a passage either endorsing or dismissing the idea of belief in free will 
(MacKenzie, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2014; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Subsequently, participants 
completed measures of threat to belief in free will and to meaningfulness. Importantly, we 
used different materials from earlier research for convergent validity (Crescioni et al., 2016).  
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Method 
 Participants and design. Eighty-five participants were recruited from 
ProlificAcademic.co.uk (Mage = 32.47, SD = 11.50, range = 18-73; 35 women, 50 men). 
Prolific Academic is a data collection website, founded by academic researchers, where 
participants can complete surveys for payment. All participants reported acceptable English 
and were paid €0.44 each. Study 1 was a between-subjects (free will: belief vs. disbelief) 
experiment. No participants were excluded from analysis. 
We used the effect and sample sizes from previous literature (Bergner & Ramon, 
2013; Crescioni et al., 2016) as guidance for an appropriate sample size for Study 1. Post-hoc 
analyses showed that our sample size allowed us to detect significant differences between 
experimental conditions with effect sizes of η2 = 0.08 or more (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) with a power of 0.76 when adopting a Type-I error rate of α ≤ .05 (two-
tailed). Data collection was completed prior to analyzing the data. 
Materials and procedure. Participants gave their informed consent and reported 
demographics. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions. Our free will belief manipulation required participants to read a passage of text 
(Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Participants were told that the study was a reading comprehension 
on psychology. The text argued either for or against the existence of free will, depending on 
condition. Both passages were modified extracts from ‘The Astonishing Hypothesis’ by 
Francis Crick (1994). In the control condition, participants read a passage on the nature of 
consciousness. In the experimental condition, participants read a passage, of roughly equal 
length, which dismissed the idea of belief in free will. This passage contained the lines: 
“…your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a 
vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” and “…one is not conscious of 
the ‘computations’ done by this part of the brain but only of the ‘decisions’ it makes – that is, 
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plans.” In addition, the anti-free will condition was modified slightly by including the lines 
“Everything people are and do is the product of simple, physical processes in their brains” 
and “There is no need for the existence of free will to explain how we behave.” Similarly, the 
control condition included the extra lines “Everything people are and do is mostly a product 
of the decisions they make and their free will” and “There is a strong need to consider free 
will when trying to explain human behavior” (MacKenzie et al., 2014).  
Previous research showed that reading the experimental (versus control) condition’s 
passage caused decreased activity in cerebral areas associated with voluntary motor 
preparation, error detection (Lynn et al., 2014; Rigoni et al., 2011; Rigoni et al., 2015), and 
reduced ethical behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). In addition, the manipulation fosters 
changes in free will belief specifically and does not seem to affect feelings of accountability, 
agency, mood, locus of control, conscientiousness, Protestant work ethic, or learned 
helplessness (Baumeister et al., 2009). 
To ensure that they comprehended the main point, participants typed a summary of 
the essay, while the essay was still on screen, listing at least three key points. The ‘Continue’ 
button was programmed to appear after two minutes to give participants time to read the text 
and write the summary. A content analysis of the summaries confirmed that all participants 
paid attention to the texts. As manipulation check, we asked participants: “How much did the 
text you read cast doubt on the belief that you have free will?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; 
M = 3.46, SD = 1.94). In addition, participants rated meaninglessness: “To what extent did 
the text you read make you feel a sense of meaninglessness?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; 
M = 2.95, SD = 1.82; Alquist et al., 2013; Routledge et al., 2011).1 Afterwards, participants 
were debriefed, thanked, and rewarded for their participation. Descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table 1. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation check. We entered participants’ scores on the manipulation check item 
as the dependent variable in a one-way ANOVA with the free will belief manipulation (free 
will: belief vs. disbelief) included as the independent variable. As predicted, participants who 
read the passage arguing against free will reported significantly greater doubts on their free 
will beliefs (M = 4.12, SD = 1.89) than those who read a passage arguing in favor of free will 
(M = 2.56, SD = 1.65), F(1,83) = 15.89, p < .001, η2 = 0.16. Thus, our manipulation was 
effective.     
 Meaninglessness. Participants’ responses to the meaninglessness item were entered 
as the dependent variable in a one-way ANOVA with the free will belief manipulation as the 
independent variable. As expected, participants in the disbelief in free will condition reported 
significantly more meaninglessness after reading the text (M = 3.39, SD = 1.88) than those in 
the belief in free will condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.57), F(1,83) = 7.09, p = .009, η2 = 0.08.2  
 Study 1’s findings suggested that a belief in free will manipulation simultaneously 
elicited differences in meaninglessness, suggesting the meaning-regulation function of belief 
in free will. Although the relationship between disbelief in free will and meaninglessness has 
been investigated previously (Crescioni et al., 2016), to our knowledge, Study 1 is the first 
experiment to replicate this relationship using different materials.  
It could be argued that the manipulation check and dependent variable in Study 1 
were uninformative because they didn’t indicate whether participants’ belief in free will 
changed as a result of the essay they read, whether belief in free will bolstered meaning, or if 
disbelief in free will reduced meaning. Rather, the items asked to what extents the text cast 
doubt on belief in free will and made participants feel a sense of meaninglessness. We believe 
that these were appropriate items. These measures have been used by other free will and 
meaning researchers (e.g., Alquist et al., 2013; Routledge et al., 2011). Based on how these 
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items were worded and their positive correlation, our data showed that when beliefs in free 
will are challenged by a particular source, people feel a sense of meaninglessness from the 
same source.  
 Additionally, some people may be hesitant to reduce belief in free will as the belief 
gives them a sense of meaningfulness. Rather, the challenge to these beliefs is what leads to 
meaninglessness. It is also possible that people who value these meaningful beliefs may cling 
to them when challenged (e.g., Heine et al., 2006). Some researchers have also suggested that 
asking participants to indicate the extent to which they believe in free will or have meaning 
may not be appropriate as state measures because the wording often implies trait qualities 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011). These trait measures may not adequately capture the meaning 
threat of current challenges to belief in free will and meaning. In any case, we used different 
multi-item measures of free will beliefs and meaninglessness in our remaining studies for 
convergent validity. 
Study 2a and 2b 
 Study 1 showed that threats to belief in free will causes perceived meaninglessness. In 
Study 2, we investigated the proposed, and yet empirically untested, relationship between 
meaninglessness and conformity. Study 2 was divided into two sub-studies. Study 2a was a 
correlational study that investigated the relationship between perceived meaninglessness and 
conformity. Study 2b adapted the same correlational design but investigated the relationship 
between meaninglessness and a concept closely related to conformity: compliance (Cialdini 
& Trost, 1998; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Gudjonsson, 1989).3  
 Like conformity (e.g., Diener, 1979; Mullen, 1991; Zimbardo, 2007), compliance can, 
in some cases, lower objective self-awareness (e.g., to avoid confrontation with others, 
Milgram, 1974; Tilker, 1970; Zimbardo, 2007); a strategy that may be useful in response to 
meaning threats (Wisman & Koole, 2003; Wisman & Shrira, 2006). In the development of 
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the measure of compliance that we adopted in Study 2b (Gudjonsson, 1989), a factor was 
identified on avoidance behavior (i.e., losing the symbolic self). This factor seems 
particularly relevant regarding our chosen theoretical framework (Wisman, 2006) and is also 
relevant to conformity (e.g., Diener, 1979; Mullen, 1991; Zimbardo, 2007). For exploratory 
purposes, we investigated the correlation between meaninglessness and this factor in Study 
2b. 
Method 
Participants and design. In Study 2a, 80 participants were recruited at 
ProlificAcademic.co.uk (Mage = 29.48, SD = 10.20, age range = 18-60; 27 women, 53 men). 
All participants reported acceptable English. Participants were remunerated with €0.26 each. 
No participants were excluded. 
In Study 2b, 107 participants were recruited at ProlificAcademic.co.uk (Mage = 31.26, 
SD = 9.93, range = 19-60; 43 women, 63 men, 1 undeclared). All participants reported 
acceptable English. No participants were excluded. Participants were remunerated with €0.31 
each.  
In Study 2a, a post-hoc analysis showed that our sample size allowed us to detect our 
achieved correlation coefficient with a power of 0.72 when adopting a Type-I error rate of α 
≤ .05 (two-tailed; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). In Study 2b, a post-hoc analysis 
showed that our sample size allowed us to detect our achieved correlation coefficients with a 
power of 0.70 and 0.93 respectively, when adopting a Type-I error rate of α ≤ .05 (two-tailed; 
Faul et al. 2009). In Study 2a, data collection was completed prior to analyzing the data. In 
Study 2b, data was collected in two stages, checked after recruiting the initial subsample, and 
fully analyzed after recruiting the overall sample.4  
 Materials and procedure. In both studies, participants gave their informed consent 
and reported demographics. In Study 2a, participants completed measures of perceived 
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meaninglessness and conformity in a random order. Perceived meaninglessness was 
measured using five items adapted from earlier research by Van Tilburg and Igou (2013; e.g., 
“I often experience a sense of meaninglessness”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M 
= 3.68, SD = 1.55; α = .91). Conformity was measured using the ten-item conformity scale 
(Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995; e.g., “I often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others”; 1 = not 
at all true of me, 7 = extremely true of me; M = 3.42, SD = 0.89; α = .80). Afterwards, 
participants were debriefed, thanked, and rewarded. 
In Study 2b, participants were presented with measures of perceived meaninglessness 
and compliance in a random order. Meaninglessness was measured using the same scale as in 
Study 2a (M = 3.51, SD = 1.45; α = .90; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2013).  
 We measured compliance using the twenty-item Gudjonsson compliance scale 
(Gudjonsson, 1989). We modified the measure using an interval scale (e.g., “I give in easily 
when I am pressured”; 1 = not at all true of me, 7 = extremely true of me; M = 3.80, SD = 
0.80; α = .85). The avoidance behavior factor of the compliance scale contained ten items 
(e.g., “I believe in avoiding rather than facing demanding and frightening situations”; 1 = not 
at all true of me, 7 = extremely true of me; M = 3.67, SD = 0.90, α = .78). Afterwards, 
participants were debriefed, thanked, and rewarded. Descriptive statistics are reported in 
Table 2. 
Results and Discussion 
 In Study 2a, meaninglessness correlated positively and significantly with conformity, 
r(78) = .29, p = .010, 95% CI [0.07, 0.48]. In Study 2b, meaninglessness correlated positively 
and significantly with compliance, r(104) = .23, p = .018, 95% CI [0.04, 0.40], and with the 
avoidance factor, r(104) = .33, p = .001, 95% CI [0.14, 0.49].  
  Our hypothesis was supported; meaninglessness correlated with increased 
conformity, compliance, and avoidance behaviors. These findings are consistent with losing 
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the self by conforming to others so as to avoid awareness of the symbolic self, necessary to 
perceive meaning threats (e.g., Wisman, 2006; Wisman & Koole, 2003). Furthermore, the 
effect size for the avoidance aspect of compliance was more strongly related to 
meaninglessness, suggesting that this specific aspect of compliance (and also conformity) 
may be most relevant for dealing with meaning-threats in the context of existential escape 
(Wisman, 2006).  
To our knowledge, Studies 2a and 2b are the first studies to investigate a specific 
relationship between perceived meaninglessness, conformity, and compliance. Having 
established that regularly experiencing a sense of meaninglessness was associated with 
conformity, we investigated whether disbelief in free will is associated with increased 
conformity via perceptions of meaninglessness. 
Study 3a and 3b 
In Study 3, we integrated the key constructs from Studies 1-2 into one comprehensive 
design. We predicted that disbelief in free will would promote conformity as a function of 
increased perceptions of meaninglessness. Study 3 was divided into two sub-studies. We 
investigated the relationship between disbelief in free will, perceived meaninglessness, and 
conformity using a correlational design in Study 3a. 
Further, we predicted that conformity in response to a meaning threat (e.g., disbelief 
in free will) is enacted to address the perceived meaninglessness of those threats, in particular 
at high levels of self-awareness. Perceptions of meaninglessness are sourced in the symbolic 
self (Carver, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985; Silvia & Duval, 
2001; Silvia & Phillips, 2013) and enhanced under conditions of greater self-awareness 
(Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003; Taubman Ben-Ari & Noy, 2010). We predicted that the 
proposed indirect effect of disbelief in free will on conformity would be stronger at higher 
levels of self-awareness (e.g., a conditional indirect effect), in line with previous existential 
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escape literature (Moynihan et al., 2015; Moynihan et al., 2017b; Wisman et al., 2015). 
Accordingly, we included a measure of self-awareness for our proposed model in Study 3b. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Ninety-six participants were recruited at 
ProlificAcademic.co.uk for Study 3a (Mage = 28.17, SD = 8.87, age range = 18-67; 39 women, 
57 men). All participants reported acceptable English. Participants were remunerated with 
€0.22. No participants were excluded from analysis. We used the effect sizes from previous 
literature (e.g., Moynihan et al., 2017a), and Study 2a as guidance for an appropriate sample 
size for Study 3a. Post-hoc analyses showed that our sample size allowed us to detect our 
achieved indirect effect with a power of 0.48 when adopting a Type-I error rate of α ≤ .05, 
10,000 power analysis replications, and 20,000 Monte Carlo draws per replications (two-
tailed; Schoemann, Boulton, & Short, 2017). Data collection for Study 3a was completed 
prior to analyzing the data.   
In Study 3b, two hundred and three participants were recruited at 
ProlificAcademic.co.uk (Mage = 28.14, SD = 9.50, age range = 18-59; 78 women, 124 men, 1 
undeclared). All participants reported acceptable English. Participants were remunerated with 
€0.30. No participants were excluded from analysis. We used the effect sizes from previous 
literature (e.g., Moynihan et al., 2017a), Study 2a, and Study 3a as guidance for an 
appropriate sample size. Post-hoc analyses showed that our sample size allowed us to detect 
our achieved indirect effect with a power of 0.68 when adopting a Type-I error rate of α ≤ 
.05, 10,000 power analysis replications, and 20,000 Monte Carlo draws per replications (two-
tailed; Schoemann et al., 2017). Data collection for Study 3b was completed in two stages, 
checked after recruiting the initial subsample, and fully analyzed after recruiting the overall 
sample.5 
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Materials and procedure. In Study 3a, participants gave their informed consent and 
reported demographics. Next, three scales measuring belief in free will, perceived 
meaninglessness, and conformity were presented in random order. Belief in free will was 
measured using the seven-item free will belief subscale of the free will and determinism scale 
- plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). For this study, items on the subscale were reversed-scored to 
measure disbelief in free will (e.g., “People are always at fault for their bad behavior” – 
reverse-scored; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 2.72, SD = 1.05; α = .83). 
We measured perceived meaninglessness using the five-item scale from Study 2 (e.g., 
“I often experience a sense of meaninglessness”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M 
= 3.71, SD = 1.60, α = .89, Van Tilburg & Igou, 2013). Finally, we measured conformity 
using the ten-item conformity scale, as used in Study 2a (e.g., “I tend to rely on others when I 
have to make an important decision quickly”; 1 = not at all true of me, 7 = extremely true of 
me; M = 3.49, SD = 0.86; α = .74; Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995). Descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table 3.  
For Study 3b, participants again gave their informed consent and reported 
demographics. Next, four scales measuring belief in free will, perceived meaninglessness, 
trait levels of self-awareness, and conformity were presented in random order. Belief in free 
will was again measured using the seven-item free will belief subscale of the free will and 
determinism scale - plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Items on the subscale were also reversed-
scored to measure disbelief in free will (M = 2.77, SD = 0.95; α = .79). We measured 
perceived meaninglessness using the five-item scale from Study 2 (e.g., M = 3.86, SD = 1.62, 
α = .92, Van Tilburg & Igou, 2013). Self-awareness was measured using a trait version of the 
private self-awareness subscale from the situational self-awareness scale (e.g., “Usually, I am 
conscious about my inner feelings”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.43, SD 
= 1.22; α = .79, Govern & Marsch, 2001). This three-item subscale measures the type of self-
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awareness used in self-regulation when people deal with adverse self-awareness associated 
with meaning threats (Moynihan et al., 2017b; Wisman et al., 2015). Finally, we measured 
conformity using the ten-item conformity scale from Study 2a (M = 3.41, SD = 0.81; α = .74; 
Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.  
Data screening. The distribution of disbelief in free will scores in Study 3a was 
significantly positively skewed, S-W = 0.97, df = 96, p = .024. This skew was counteracted by 
conducting the square root transformation on those scores, S-W = 0.99, df = 96, p = 0.504.  
In Study 3b, the distribution of disbelief in free will scores was also significantly, 
positively skewed, S-W = 0.97, df = 202, p < .001. This construct was also transformed using 
the square root formula to achieve normality, S-W = .99, df = 202, p = .095. Similarly, self-
awareness scores, S-W = 0.91, df = 203, p < .001, were transformed using the inverse and 
square root formulas to reduce the number of outliers from twelve to zero, S-W = 0.85, df = 
203, p < .001, S-W = 0.92, df = 203, p < .001. Scores for each variable were then 
standardized. 
Results and Discussion 
 Zero-order correlations. In Study 3a, disbelief in free will correlated positively and 
significantly with perceived meaninglessness, r(94) = .27, p = 0.007, 95% CI [0.08, 0.45], 
and conformity, r(94) = .40, p < .001, 95% CI [0.22, 0.56]. Meaninglessness also correlated 
positively and significantly with conformity, r(94) = .32, p = .002, 95% CI [0.13, 0.49].  
 In Study 3b, disbelief in free will correlated positively and significantly with 
perceived meaninglessness, r(200) = .26, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.13, 0.38], and conformity, 
r(200) = .25, p < .001, 95% CI [0.12, 0.38]. Further, meaninglessness correlated positively 
and significantly with conformity, r(200) = .23,  p = .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.36]. Collectively, 
these relationships were in accordance with our hypothesis. Having established these 
relationships, we proceeded to test our proposed mediation models. 
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 Mediation analysis. Again, we predicted a significant indirect effect of disbelief in 
free will on increased conformity through perceived meaninglessness in Studies 3a and 3b. 
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes’s (2012, Model 4) 
PROCESS macro. In Study 3a, disbelief in free will was entered as the predictor variable, 
perceived meaninglessness as the mediator, and conformity as the outcome variable. All 
scores were standardized. As expected, we found a significant indirect effect of disbelief in 
free will on conformity via perceived meaninglessness, ab = 0.06, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.001, 
0.19]. The direct effect remained significant, B = 0.34, SE = 0.10, p < .001 (Figure 1). Thus, 
perceived meaninglessness mediated the relationship between disbelief in free will and 
conformity, supporting our hypothesis.  
We also conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes’s (2012, Model 4) PROCESS 
macro in Study 3b. As expected, there was a significant indirect effect of disbelief in free will 
on increased conformity through meaninglessness, ab = 0.05, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.01, 0.11]. 
The direct effect remained significant, B = 0.21, SE = 0.07, p = .004 (Figure 2). Hence, we 
replicated the results of Study 3a.  
 Moderated mediation analysis. Additionally, we proposed that the effect of disbelief 
in free will on conformity through perceived meaninglessness would be greater at higher 
levels of self-awareness. Accordingly, we supplemented our mediation model with self-
awareness included as a moderator in Study 3b. This moderated mediation model was 
investigated using Hayes’s (2012, Model 7) PROCESS macro. Disbelief in free will was 
entered as the predictor in the model, perceived meaninglessness as the mediator, self-
awareness as the moderator, and conformity as the outcome variable (all standardized; Figure 
3). As expected, the index of moderated mediation was significant, B = 0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% 
CI [0.01, 0.08]; self-awareness significantly interacted with disbelief in free will to predict 
increased meaninglessness perceptions, B = 0.18, SE = 0.07, p = .011. Indeed, there were 
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significant conditional indirect effects in which the effect of disbelief in free will on 
conformity through meaninglessness was significantly stronger at greater levels of self-
awareness (Table 5). Thus, our hypothesis was supported. 
Additional analyses. When the samples from Study 3a and 3b were combined (N = 
299), random-effects meta-analyses produced consistent mean effect sizes for the correlations 
that composed the mediation models across the studies: (i) disbelief in free will and 
meaninglessness: d = 0.55, SD = 0.01, 95% CI [0.22, 0.89], (ii) meaninglessness and 
conformity: d = 0.54, SD = 0.09, 95% CI [0.21, 0.88], (iii) disbelief in free will and 
conformity: d = 0.64, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [0.30, 0.98]. Thus, there were significant 
relationships between the constructs that composed the mediation models across Studies 3a 
and 3b.  
Similarly, there was a significant indirect effect of disbelief in free will on increased 
conformity via meaninglessness (Hayes, 2012, Model 4), ab = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.02, 
0.10] in our combined sample. Post-hoc analyses showed that our sample size when Study 3a 
and 3b samples were pooled allowed us to detect our achieved indirect effect with a power of 
0.92 when adopting a Type-I error rate of α ≤ .05, 10,000 power analysis replications, and 
20,000 Monte Carlo draws per replications (two-tailed; Schoemann et al., 2017).6 A multiple 
group comparison also showed that the indirect effects between Study 3a and 3b did not 
differ significantly, B = 0.02, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.15].  
In summary, we incorporated relationships from Studies 1 and 2 into our proposed 
theoretical model for Studies 3a and 3b. Disbelief in free will promoted conformity via 
perceived meaninglessness in both studies. Additionally, we supplemented our proposed 
mediation model in Study 3b with self-awareness as a moderator. Consistent with the 
literature on existential escape (Moynihan et al., 2015; Wisman et al., 2015), the effect of 
disbelief in free will on conformity through meaninglessness was significantly stronger at 
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greater self-awareness (Moynihan et al., 2015; Moynihan et al., 2017b; Wisman et al., 2015). 
That is, when the meaninglessness signaled by disbelief in free will is particularly salient, as 
under high self-awareness, people should conform (e.g., attempt to escape the self) more.  
General Discussion 
Our hypothesis was that disbelief in free will promotes conformity via perceived 
meaninglessness, particularly under high self-awareness. In our first study, we found the 
predicted, causal relationship between a threat to free will belief and perceived 
meaninglessness. In Study 2, meaninglessness correlated positively and significantly with 
conformity, compliance, and related avoidance behaviors. In Study 3, we found a significant 
indirect effect of disbelief in free will on increased conformity via perceived 
meaninglessness. Indeed, in Study 3b, the indirect effect was significantly stronger at higher 
levels of self-awareness, thus lending support to the existential escape hypothesis (Wisman, 
2006; Wisman et al., 2015). These findings suggest that the effect of disbelief in free will on 
increased conformity is stronger at greater self-awareness to address the heightened 
perceptions of meaninglessness (e.g., Wisman, 2006).  
Free Will Beliefs, Inferred Meaning, and Conformity 
Our results add to the literature on free will beliefs, associated inferences of meaning, 
and self-regulatory processes affecting conformity. Belief in free will involves making 
choices based on one’s own thoughts and values and being resistant to external pressures 
(Feldman et al., 2014; Feldman et al. 2016; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010; Stillman et al., 
2011). In contrast, conformity refers to changes in behavior or attitudes designed to imitate or 
match those of real or imagined others. In some circumstances, these practices require little 
effort (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) and are also associated with rejecting reality (e.g., Asch, 1952; 
Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2003). Thus, people who conform can yield to social pressure, 
rather than behaving in accordance with their own values and judgments, as is the case with 
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belief in free will (e.g., Feldman et al., 2014). Indeed, certain types of conformity may be 
used as avoidance coping strategies that address stressful events, involving a lack of 
autonomy, by withdrawing effort and thus the self (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2003).  
Since reducing people's belief in free will makes them less willing to exert effort for 
volition and self-control (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), conformity 
may be a particularly useful strategy to deal with threats to belief in free will. Reduced free 
will beliefs lessens people’s intentional efforts and leads them to select less demanding, 
easier, and automatic courses of action (Rigoni et al., 2011; Rigoni et al., 2012). 
Concurrently, conformity can be habitual and spontaneous (Epley & Gilovich, 1999) making 
it an attractive strategy in these circumstances (Alquist et al., 2013). 
Simultaneously, disbelief in free will is associated with meaninglessness (Alquist et 
al., 2013; Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Crescioni et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2014; Seto et al., 2014). 
Meaninglessness has, in turn, been associated with conformity as a defense against meaning 
threats (Arndt et al., 2002; Wisman & Koole, 2003; Wisman & Shrira, 2006). Thus, increased 
conformity in response to disbelief in free will may be considered as a means of dealing with 
the perceived meaninglessness of that threat (e.g., Wisman, 2006).  
Concurrently, our theoretical framework premises that losing self-awareness can be 
used as a defense mechanism in response to meaning threats (Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2012; 
Wisman, 2006; see also Griskevicius et al., 2006). A sense of symbolic self-awareness is 
required to perceive the meaninglessness signaled by meaning threats (Kim et al., 2014; 
Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003). Directing attention toward the self initiates a self-evaluative 
process in which one’s current state on a salient dimension is compared with ideal standards 
for that dimension (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Thus, levels of discrepancy between the 
current self (meaningless) and ideal standards (meaningfulness; Heine et al., 2006) are noted.  
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Critically, Wisman (2006) argues that conformity engenders a loss of self-awareness 
in some cases (e.g., Diener, 1979; Mullen, 1991; Zimbardo, 2007). Since perceptions of 
meaninglessness are enhanced under conditions of greater self-awareness (Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 2003; Taubman Ben-Ari & Noy, 2010), conformity, as an existential response, 
may be a particularly useful means to address the threat of disbelief in free will and 
specifically the meaninglessness that the threat signals. Thus, by abandoning the facility 
needed to perceive meaning threats (Kim et al., 2014; Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003), 
conformity would be an appropriate means to counteract the problematic meaninglessness 
signaled by disbelief in free will, particularly among those high in self-awareness (Wisman, 
2006).  
To our knowledge, the current studies are the first to demonstrate an existential 
function of disbelief in free will on conformity. A central contribution of our research that 
extends on earlier work by Alquist et al. (2013) is that at least part of the relationship between 
disbelief in free will and conformity can be interpreted as an attempt at existential escape 
(Wisman, 2006). Specifically, we propose that disbelief in free will promotes conformity, at 
least in part, as an attempt to escape from the existential threat signaled by threats to free will 
beliefs. In this regard, our research adapted a greater focus on the role of meaninglessness 
perceptions within free will beliefs’ and conformity’s relationship than preliminary findings 
noted in earlier research. In our research, we investigated and incorporated the roles of 
perceived meaninglessness and self-awareness in this relationship and interpret the findings 
using the existential escape hypothesis (Wisman, 2006). This particular explanation of the 
relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity has not been tested previously.  
The Social Roots of Conformity as a Defense Mechanism 
Wisman (2006) references human cultural evolution to speculate how conformity 
developed as an existential defense mechanism. Certain aspects of affiliation are related to 
DISBELIEF IN FREE WILL & CONFORMITY                                                                   25 
 
innate mechanisms that play a role in coping with distress (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; 
Uchino, 2006). From this affiliation, protective behaviors such as conformity that suppress 
self-awareness may have evolved through cultural development (Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b) 
to help people cope with meaning threats effectively (Wisman, 2006). Indeed, Griskevicius et 
al. (2006) note that social mind-sets facilitate functional perceptions, cognitions, and 
behaviors. These mind-sets often occur automatically and outside of conscious awareness. 
Consistently, Griskevicius et al. suggest that conformity serves as a strategy in protecting 
oneself from danger that facilitates actions designed to avoid self-awareness and addresses 
negative arousal (Dijksterhuis, Bargh, & Miedema, 2000; Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2014). That 
is, conformity may facilitate actions designed to avoid self-awareness and in turn help people 
to deal with meaninglessness (Wisman, 2006). 
Mood 
It is unlikely that mood is an alternative explanation of our findings. In previous 
research, the effects of belief in free will on meaning in life (Crescioni et al., 2016) and on 
conformity (Alquist et al., 2013) were maintained, controlling for mood. On a broader level, 
meaning-regulation strategies employed following meaning threats seem to be independent of 
negative affect (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012). Mood did not mediate the relationships 
between meaning threats and consequent behaviors in previous research (Twenge, Catanese, 
& Baumeister, 2003) as they develop slower (e.g., Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 
2005). Moreover, it has been argued that negative affect may later run parallel to these 
processes (DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im, & Williams, 2010). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our studies offer important directions for future research. When people encounter 
meaning threats, such as challenges to free will beliefs, they assess the resources afforded in 
their environment to help them to address meaninglessness (Jonas et al., 2014). Wisman 
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(2006) postulates that those with stronger, coherent worldviews may manage meaning threats 
by worldview defense (Dechesne et al., 2003), whereas people with weaker, less coherent 
worldviews or who feel incompetent to maintain the standards set by certain cultural norms 
may be more prone to engaging in existential escape. People may also be disinclined to 
regulate meaning using the symbolic self if their worldviews conflict with one another or are 
being refuted (Wisman, 2006). In relation, Wisman argues that if people feel that there are 
unable to reduce the perceived discrepancy between their actual (meaningless) and ideal 
(meaningful) selves, they may attempt to deal with meaning threats through existential escape 
(Carver, 1975; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985; Silvia & Duval, 2001).  
Based on free will beliefs’ cognitive basis and links to social mind-sets (Baumeister 
2008a, 2008b; Griskevicius et al., 2008), losing one’s self-awareness by conforming may be 
an easily facilitated means to escape meaninglessness, which requires little self-regulatory 
expenditure, considering the nature of disbelief in free will on lowered volition (e.g., Alquist 
et al., 2013; Baumeister et al., 2009; Lynn et al., 2014; Rigoni et al., 2012; Stillman et al., 
2011). Accordingly, there is likely a habitual, spontaneous process involving conformity as a 
defense against meaning threats, as we outline in our research. However, at times, conscious, 
deliberative processes involving the symbolic self (i.e., meaning structures; Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 2003) may instead operate within specific social contexts (i.e., affirming social 
identification with valued in-groups as a means of existential defense; Castano et al., 2004; 
Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011).  
We also acknowledge other researchers’ argument that uncertainty may be a 
supplementary explanation for findings in existential psychology (e.g., Van den Bos 2009a, 
2009b; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). For example, mortality salience leads people to be 
more uncertain, suggesting that perceived uncertainty is an important psychological 
mechanism underlying mortality salience, or more broadly, meaning-regulation effects 
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(Hohman & Hogg, 2011; Martin, 1999; Van den Bos & Lind, 2009; Yavuz & Van den Bos, 
2009), at least in some contexts (Martin & Van den Bos, 2014). However, these effects were 
mostly found among participants who thought of uncertainty as a result of mortality salience 
than those who did not (Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). 
Although not all meaning threats have a clear association with uncertainty (e.g., Heine et al., 
2006), future research should examine if uncertainty is an additional variable in the 
existential escape process and crucially if it adds to predictability, at least in some cases. 
Self-esteem. Other researchers highlighted that individual differences may influence 
people’s propensity to conform in response to meaning threats (e.g., Alquist et al., 2013). One 
such factor is self-esteem (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Wisman et al. (2015) argue that those 
with low self-esteem should be especially prone to existential escape as a response to 
meaning-threats. People with low self-esteem are more likely to experience negative self-
discrepancies (Cheng, Govorun, & Chartrand, 2012; Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) and lack the resources to affirm self-esteem as a defense. 
Other researchers have also suggested that low self-esteem, associated with disengaging from 
one’s own values (e.g., the symbolic self), may mediate the effect of adverse self-awareness 
on conformity (Arndt et al., 2002; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2003). Therefore, it seems 
likely that those low in self-esteem, induced to disbelieve in free will, may be particularly 
likely to conform as an existential escape defense.  
Non-conformity as a meaning source. Interestingly, conformity and non-conformity 
can both contribute to a meaningful, positive self-concept (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986). Regarding the former, a coherent sense of self (Campbell et al., 
1996; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2002), as informed by one's group identity (e.g., Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), can contribute to a sense of meaningfulness (Castano et al., 2004; Castano et 
al., 2002; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011) and defend 
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against meaning threats, using the symbolic self (Heine et al., 2006; Sedikides & Skowronski, 
1997). Research on minority opinions has also shown that minority opinion holders can have 
a more clearly defined sense of self than majority opinion holders (Rios, Morrison, & 
Wheeler, 2010), in particular when opinions are highly expressive of their values and among 
those who hold minority opinions relative to their in-group. Although affirming a coherent 
sense of self is a different meaning-regulation process than what is predicted by the 
existential escape hypothesis (Wisman, 2006), as it involves maintaining symbolic self-
awareness (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003), research on self-concept clarity sheds further 
light on how certain people may be more likely to engage in existential escape.  
Diversity within conformity. Regarding the nature of the relationship between 
disbelief in free will and conformity, we understand conformity as a means to escape the 
conflicted self, which is especially functional when self-awareness, and with that the 
conflicted self, is high (Wisman, 2006). The route to conformity is conceptualized as a 
habitual, low-effortful process following threats to disbelief in free will that undermines self-
regulation (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). That said, the actual process of 
conformity can take on different shapes with regard to the degree of consciousness and 
effortful processing. As highlighted previously, conformity can also be conceptualized as an 
active and engaging process, involving more cognitive processing (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2012). Whereas, conformity is sought to suppress awareness of the 
conflicted self, in other cases, conformity might go beyond this motive by drawing attention 
to and boosting the social self, but still drawing away attention from the conflicted self, a 
process that could be supported by certain individual differences, as previously highlighted.  
Conformity as escape. Indeed, an alternative type of conformity could involve a 
sense of symbolic self-awareness for self-regulation purposes and active engagement, while 
monitoring one’s adherence to group norms (Baumeister, 2005; Baumeister, Bauer, & Lloyd, 
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2011; Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Schnuerch & 
Gibbons, 2014). It could be argued from our data that increased conformity may be due to 
willingness to please others or boost the symbolic self rather than as an attempt to suppress 
adverse self-awareness. Our studies were not designed to test the effects of conformity on 
reduced self-awareness. Yet, our chosen measure of conformity throughout our studies 
correlates with feelings of being influenced or controlled by a situation or others rather than 
the self (Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995). Further, our data shows that perceptions of 
meaninglessness associated with conformity involve high levels of self-awareness. 
Consistently, the desire to escape self-awareness has been associated with enacting escape 
behaviors, suggesting that conformity is used at least to try and escape from adverse self-
awareness (e.g., Baumeister, 1991; Twenge et al., 2003).  
Our conclusion rests on previous findings that people attempt to deal with adverse 
self-awareness by engaging in behaviors that suppress introspection (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 
1972), including conformity (Asch, 1952; Diener, 1979; Mullen, 1991; Zimbardo, 2007), 
consistent with the tenets of the existential escape hypothesis (Wisman, 2006). Our findings 
are also highly consistent with other literature on existential escape (e.g., Moynihan et al., 
2015; Moynihan et al., 2017b) that in the vast majority of cases did not assess whether 
existential escape behaviors were ultimately successful in dealing with meaning threats. 
Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that conformity is an effective form of existential escape 
(e.g., Wisman & Koole, 2003; see also Wisman et al., 2015; Wisman & Shrira, 2015). 
Wisman and Koole (2003) found that mortality salience made participants more intent in 
sitting next to and among group members, as opposed to sitting alone. Moreover, this was 
true even when the increased affiliation meant that participants’ worldviews (a source of 
meaning involving the symbolic self) were threatened by the group with whom they were 
affiliating and when affiliating with the group meant that participants had to attack their own 
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worldviews. Indeed, increased interest in associating with others led to weaker defense of 
one’s worldviews, an indicator that meaning threats have been dealt with effectively 
(Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Wisman and Koole suggest that whereas 
worldview defense is presumably mediated by cultural–symbolic processes, the more 
immediate buffering function of affiliation may be mediated to a considerable degree by 
faster, automatic, sub-cognitive, biologically based mechanisms (see also Koole, Sin, & 
Schneider, 2014). Although the consequences of conformity and its potential multiple roles 
were not the central focus of our research, we acknowledge that more research is required to 
demonstrate the specific consequences of conformity in existential escape and their 
functionality. 
Correlational designs. On another note, we mainly adapted correlational approaches 
to test our hypothesis. Casual evidence for the relationships between disbelief in free will and 
meaninglessness (Crescioni et al., 2016), disbelief in free will and conformity (Alquist et al., 
2013), and meaninglessness and conformity (inherent in results found by Wisman & Koole, 
2003) have been demonstrated previously, but not within an integrated and comprehensive 
model. As a result, our research has not yet established a causal relationship between the four 
major constructs. Although continuous predictor variables are acceptable to include in 
mediation analyses when the model and indirect effect(s) are informed by theory (Hayes, 
2013; Hayes & Scharkow, 2013), as presented here, experimental replications of our 
proposed model are required. Experimental and longitudinal replications of these studies that 
examine (latent) cross-lagged mediation models will provide greater for our proposed model. 
Relatedly, in Study 3’s results, the direct effects of disbelief in free will on conformity 
remained significant alongside the indirect effects, when both were accountable within the 
mediation model. Thus, the indirect effect we propose is likely one specific aspect of the 
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relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity and other candidate mediators 
exist.  
Practical applications. Regarding practical applications, disbelief in free will has 
been associated with several anti-social behaviors (e.g., aggression, cheating, lack of guilt; 
Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010) that may 
relate to social phenomena such as conformity (e.g., Alquist et al., 2013; Zimbardo, 2007). 
Clark et al. (2014) suggested that situational factors could be investigated that promote 
beliefs in free will to help alleviate maladaptive behaviors that are associated with 
meaninglessness. Further, as meaning-regulation is a dynamic process (Heine et al., 2006), 
people could be educated about meaning-regulation responses and be provided with 
opportunities to regulate meaning that is more beneficial for individuals and society. 
Understanding the relationships between these psychological constructs may ultimately 
inform personal development programs (e.g., Vohs & Baumeister, 2010). 
Conclusion 
 We reckon that our studies are the first to indicate an existential function of 
conformity in response to disbelief in free will. Disbelief in free will promotes 
meaninglessness and motivates people to conform as an existential defense, especially when 
self-awareness is high. Reducing self-awareness to reduce the existential conflict then likely 
becomes the regulatory goal. Consistently, we found that promoting disbelief in free will 
increased meaninglessness perceptions, using different materials from previous literature 
(Crescioni et al., 2016). We also addressed a gap in the literature by directly focusing and 
identifying a relationship between meaninglessness perceptions and increased conformity. 
Perhaps most importantly, perceived meaninglessness explained part of the relationship 
between disbelief in free will and conformity. Further, our results suggest that this effect is 
more pronounced at higher levels of self-awareness, suggesting that people may deal with 
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perceived meaninglessness, signaled belief in free will, and captured by self-awareness, 
through an existential escape process resulting in conformity. 
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Footnotes 
1 Although in the context of existential escape, meaning search is not a central 
variable, we included an item assessing meaning search at the end of Study 1 (“To what 
extent did the text you read make you feel like doing something more meaningful?” 1 = not 
at all, 7 = very much; M = 3.27, SD = 1.92; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012) for exploratory 
reasons after other measures were taken. We did not find a significant difference in meaning 
search between the pro (M = 3.33, SD = 2.03) and anti-free will (M = 3.23, SD = 1.86) 
conditions, F(1,83) = 0.07, p = .798, η2 = 0.001. Interestingly, we did find a significant 
positive correlation between the meaning search item and perceived meaninglessness, r(83) = 
.35, p = .001, 95% CI [0.15, 0.52], consistent with other literature (e.g., Heine et al., 2006). 
There was also a significant positive correlation between meaning search and doubt cast on 
belief in free will, r(83) = .40, p < .001, 95% [0.21, 0.57], consistent with literature indicating 
free will belief as a source of meaning (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Crescioni et al., 2016; 
Moynihan et al., 2017a). 
2 As the manipulation in Study 1 simultaneously elicited differences in free will 
beliefs and meaninglessness, we conducted a correlational analysis on the manipulation check 
and meaninglessness items. There was a significant, positive correlation between threatening 
beliefs in free will and meaning, r(83) = .51, p < .001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.65]. We also 
conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS macro to assess if casting 
doubt on beliefs in free will mediated the effect of the manipulation on perceived 
meaninglessness. The free will belief manipulation (effect-coded: -1 = belief in free will, 1 = 
disbelief in free will) was entered as the independent variable in the model, the manipulation 
check item was entered as the mediator, and the meaninglessness item as the outcome 
variable (Hayes, 2012, Model 4). Scores for the mediator and outcome variable were 
standardized. We found a significant indirect effect of the free will belief manipulation on 
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threats to meaning through casting doubt on belief in free will, ab = 0.19, SE = 0.06, 95% CI 
[0.09, 0.34]. The direct effect of the belief in free will manipulation on meaninglessness was 
not significant when controlling for the mediator, B = 0.09, SE = 0.10, p = .371. Post-hoc 
power analyses showed that our sample size also allowed us to detect our achieved indirect 
effect with a power of 0.97 when adopting a Type-I error rate of α ≤ .05, 10,000 power 
analysis replications, and 20,000 Monte Carlo draws per replications (two-tailed; Schoemann 
et al., 2017). 
3 Compliance refers “to the tendency of the individual to go along with propositions, 
requests, or instructions for some immediate instrumental gain” (Gudjonsson, 1992, p. 137). 
Compliance further refers to attempts to avoid confrontation and as a result may also involve 
privately disagreeing with an explicit or implied request (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). We 
included compliance within our analysis since conformity and compliance are strongly 
related constructs (e.g., Gudjonsson, 1989) and fulfil similar goals (e.g., avoidance coping in 
response to distressing emotions, particularly in socially pressurized situations, Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Regarding our chosen theoretical framework, 
compliance has been identified as a coping mechanism to lower adverse self-awareness 
(Milgram, 1974; Tilker, 1970), for example in avoiding conflict (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986). 
This strategy may be useful in response to meaning threats (Wisman & Koole, 2003; Wisman 
& Shrira, 2006) and is also relevant to conformity (e.g., Diener, 1979; Mullen, 1991; 
Zimbardo, 2007).  
4 Initially, we underestimated the sample size required for Study 2b and thus had to 
add participants. This is because we had only a rough idea of the potential effect size in this 
study due to a lack literature on this topic. Data for Studies 2a and 2b were collected 
simultaneously. 
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5 Initially, we underestimated the sample size required for Study 3b and thus had to 
add participants to achieve the desired sample size. In Study 3a, based on the effects found, at 
least one hundred and fifty six participants would have been required to achieve adequate 
statistical power for our achieved indirect effect (Schoemann et al., 2017). In turn, we 
recruited two hundred and three participants for Study 3b.  
6 In the Additional Analyses, excluding the multiple group comparison, the combined 
scores for disbelief in free will were transformed using the square root formula, S-W = 0.99, 
df = 298, p = .062, as the raw scores were significantly and positively skewed, S-W = 0.97, df 
= 298, p < .001.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (Study 1) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Doubt in Free Will                     N                 M               SD            Max             Min 
_________________             ______        ______       ______       ______       _______ 
Pro-Free Will Condition           36               2.56            1.65            6.00             1.00 
Anti-Free Will Condition         49               4.12            1.89            7.00             1.00 
 
Perceived Meaninglessness       N                 M               SD             Max            Min 
_________________             ______        ______       ______       ______       _______ 
Pro-Free Will Condition           36               2.36            1.57            6.00             1.00 
Anti-Free Will Condition         49               3.39            1.88            7.00             1.00 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = Sample Size, M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics (Study 2a & 2b) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 Study 2a Variables                    N                 M               SD             Max            Min 
_________________             ______        ______       ______       ______       _______ 
Conformity                               80               3.42             0.89            5.46            1.00 
Perceived Meaninglessness      80               3.68             1.55            7.00            1.00 
 
Study 2b Variables                    N                 M               SD             Max            Min 
_________________             ______        ______       ______       ______       _______ 
Compliance                              106             3.80             0.80            5.80            1.80 
Avoidance of Self                    106             3.67             0.90            6.40            1.80 
Perceived Meaninglessness     107             3.51             1.45            6.40            1.00 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = Sample Size, M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics (Study 3a) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
        Variables                            N                 M               SD             Max            Min 
_________________             ______        ______       ______       ______       _______ 
Disbelief in Free Will               96               2.72             1.05            5.86            1.00 
Perceived Meaninglessness      96               3.71             1.60            7.00            1.00 
Conformity                               96               3.49             0.86            5.64            1.55 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = Sample Size, M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics (Study 3b) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
        Variables                            N                 M               SD             Max            Min 
_________________             ______        ______       ______       ______       _______ 
Disbelief in Free Will              202             2.77             0.95            5.43            1.00 
Perceived Meaninglessness     202             3.86             1.62            7.00            1.00 
Conformity                              203             3.41             0.81            5.82            1.45 
Self-Awareness                       203             5.43             1.22            7.00            1.00 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = Sample Size, M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
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Table 5 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Disbelief in Free Will on Conformity, via Meaninglessness, at 
Levels of Self-Awareness (Study 3b) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
       Self-Awareness                   Effect                         SE                          95% CI 
__________________      ______________    ______________  ________________ 
             -0.99                                0.02                         0.02                   [-0.015, 0.08]             
              0.01                                0.05                         0.03                   [0.01, 0.11] 
              1.00                                0.08                         0.04                   [0.02, 0.17] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval at 95%. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 3a) 
Perceived 
Meaninglessness 
                             
Disbelief in Free Will 
                             
Conformity 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
B = 0.27** B = 0.23* 
B = 0.34***  (ab = 0.06, [0.001, 0.19]) 
Figure 1: The relationships between disbelief in free will and conformity, significantly 
mediated by perceived meaninglessness.  
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Figure 2: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 3b) 
Perceived 
Meaninglessness 
                             
Disbelief in Free Will 
                             
Conformity 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
B = 0.26*** B = 0.18* 
B = 0.21**  (ab = 0.05, [0.01, 0.11]) 
Figure 2: The relationships between disbelief in free will and conformity, significantly 
mediated by perceived meaninglessness.  
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Figure 3: Conceptual Representation of the Moderated Mediation Model (Study 3b) 
Perceived 
Meaninglessness 
                             
Conformity 
*p < .05 
**p < .005 
***p < .001 
B = 0.27*** 
B = 0.21**  (ab = 0.05, [0.01, 0.11]) 
Self-Awareness 
B = 0.18* 
                             
Disbelief in Free Will 
B = 0.18* 
Figure 3: The relationships between disbelief in free will and conformity, significantly 
mediated by perceived meaninglessness. The mediation model was significantly moderated 
by self-awareness. 
